On the macro-economic policy side of Central Banking a remarkable consensus has been emerging over the last two decades. This covers both the applicable theoretical framework for analysing the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and also the appropriate institutional structure for the Central Bank to deploy its macro-economic policies. The consensus about the latter structure generally involves a high degree of operational independence (from Government); the de facto selection of price stability as the primary objective, (except in those countries on a pegged, or fixed exchange rate, or in a currency union); and the choice of a short term interest rate, selected on pre-announced dates within the context of a forward-looking forecasting structure, as the main instrument. When some country strays from this consensus, for example when Poland or Venezuela seeks to curtail its Central Bank's operational independence, or when a (French?) politician casts doubt on the primacy of the price stability objective, you can almost hear the sharp intake of breath amongst the worldwide 'club' of central banks and at its focal point at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel.
There is no such consensus on the appropriate theoretical framework for the analysis of financial stability. Indeed some would claim that there is no proper theoretical framework for this function in being at all. We shall turn to this issue later, in Section B. But first we want to turn to the great diversity of institutional structures that exist for Central Banks on the stability/prudential/systemic stability wing. On this, see in particular, Mayes and Wood, The Structure of Financial Regulation, (2007) , especially their 'Introduction', and also Masciandaro and Quintyn, Independence, Accountability and Governance of Financial Supervisory Authorities, (2007) .
The earliest banks, that eventually became transformed into Central Banks, such as the Riksbank, Bank of England, Banque de France, were initially established to provide certain banking and financial services to the Government, notably including the provision of funding during war-time. In return they received certain competitive and governance advantages that quickly enabled them to become the largest commercial bank in their own country. As a result of their central role they had both a complementary relationship, (especially with the smaller country banks), and also a competitive relationship, (especially with the larger joint-stock banks), (see Goodhart, 1988 , Cameron, 1967 , 1972 .
On the complementary side, it was more efficient to centralise reserve holdings of specie with the Governments' (central) bank, (with the other commercial banks using claims on the Central Bank, notes and deposits, as reserves instead). By the same token it was far simpler to settle payments' imbalances between banks by an exchange of claims on the CB than by carting gold bullion around the country.
Moreover, a commercial banker which held balances with a CB and had a long-standing customer relationship with it would be more likely to obtain loans from the CB, when there were (temporary) liquidity problems.
Nevertheless the CB was also a direct rival for the other main commercial banks during the 19 th century, especially for the large, diversified joint stock banks that developed in the second half of the century. There are many examples of quite bitter rivalry. It was only slowly and quite reluctantly that the CB shed its commercial role towards the end of the 19 th century. Given this commercial rivalry, the idea that the CB should have direct supervisory oversight of the commercial banks, and be able to inspect their books and to review their management practices would have been unacceptable to commercial bankers at the turn of the last century.
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Essentially the way that the CBs tried to keep oversight over the stability of the banking system was to keep watch over the quality of the commercial bills in money markets, since it was such bills that the CB would be requested to discount in a crisis.
Indeed many CBs have strict limits on the nature and quality of assets that they can buy, or rediscount, or use as collateral for their Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) functions; (this was a major reason why the Bundesbank arranged for the establishment of the Likobank in 1974, since their own capacity to undertake LOLR operations was so constrained by legal limitations). The aim of CBs to ensure that the quality of available money market assets was good enough to enable them to inject liquidity into the banking system, (in case of need), without running into unacceptable danger of loss themselves. This was one of the foundations of the 'real bills' doctrine.
This doctrine provided a unifying basis both for the prudential/systemic and the 2 Also see Grossman (2006) . macro-economic policy aspects of CB policy. 3 If the (self-liquifying) characteristics of the commercial bills were good enough, being based on real trade activities, (whereby the final sale of products would raise more than enough funds to repay the debt), then both the quality and, it was assumed, the volume of such debt was sustainable, and could safely be the basis for CB market actions, including LOLR (see Bagehot, Lombard Street) .
For such reasons, much early CB prudential oversight focussed on the nature and quality of bank assets, primarily in (commercial) bill markets, but also in loan and bond markets, and not on a direct examination of the books, or management practices, of the other commercial banks. For example, in the UK, prior to the Fringe Bank crisis in 1973/74, prudential oversight in the Bank of England was the province of the Discount Office, a small section within the Cashier's Department, run by a Principal with a couple of Deputies. They focussed their attention on the Accepting Houses, whose role then included the acceptance of commercial bills (turning them into twoname bills), and on the Discount Houses, which acted as a buffer between the commercial banks on the one hand and the CB on the other. The discount houses borrowed from the commercial banks, and used the funds to invest in bills and shortdated bonds. If the commercial banks ran into liquidity shortages, they would withdraw their funds from the discount houses, which would then in turn rediscount assets with the Bank of England. The discount houses were initially fostered by the Bank, and used by the commercial banks, precisely because the historical rivalry between the two made direct dealings between them problematical. When that faded into the dim, historical past, (in the 1990s), so did the discount houses. that is, holding companies that control a single bank along with one or more non-bank subsidiaries."
"The Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) removed a number of restrictions on banking activity that had been imposed under GlassSteagall. Gramm-Leach-Bliley also permitted combining banking, securities and insurance subsidiaries under a single newly-defined financial holding company structure. The Act gave the Federal Reserve the power to authorize formation of financial holding companies, and to serve as 'umbrella regulator'. However, Gramm-Leach-Bliley further entrenched the separate functional regulators who regulate insurance, securities broker/dealers and commercial banks within the financial holding company. The Federal Reserve's powers as umbrella regulator are mitigated by requirements to defer to functional regulators in numerous ways. The Federal Reserve has considerable powers once a threat to the deposit insurance fund or more broadly a systemic concern has developed, but considerably less power to coordinate processes aimed at early detection and distress avoidance. " Bliss, (2007, pp 135/6) The structure of US financial supervision is, as a consequence, a complex muddle, involving problems of co-ordination and inter-agency rivalry. But attempts to rationalise it have failed; each of the agencies involved defends it own turf with some passion.
World War I not only destroyed much of the pre-war international financial system, centred on the (international, commercial) Bill on London, but also left the European combatant countries with a huge over-hang of government debt. Since such government debt, denominated in domestic currency, is (supposedly) default free, the banks in such countries had more than a sufficiency of 'high quality' assets which the CB could rediscount without loss. The problems that arose in the 'Great Depression were of insolvency, arising out of credit risk, rather than of illiquidity. This had to be handled by governments rather than by CBs; CBs can create liquidity; they cannot create capital.
The banking crises in Europe in the inter-war period were handled in different ways in the different countries involved. In many cases this adverse experience led to the establishment of separate institutions entrusted with responsibility for bank examination and oversight. In some countries this body, and the responsibility, was allocated to, and embedded within the CB, (e.g. Italy 4 , Spain, Ireland and, in so far as it was done at all, in the Netherlands (Mooij and Prast, 2003) "When the stability of the banking system was at stake during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the power of the Reichsbank to intervene in the management of this crisis was constrained by high levels of foreign debt and a system of fixed exchange rates. Consequently, the government had to intervene, acquiring substantial shareholdings in the problem banks. In 1961, the government founded the Federal Banking Supervisory Office as an independent institution responsible to the Minister of Finance, establishing the separation of monetary and banking supervision functions." Kahn and Santos (2007), p. 190 . Also see Dark (1938 but it did have the merit that banks subject to such direct controls bore little credit risk, and were predominantly safe (somewhat akin to nationalised utilities).
Such, somewhat artificial, stability came to an end in the late 1960s and 1970s. A restoration of faith in the operation of free markets, the liberalisation of direct controls and the continuing improvement of (international) communications, all led to conditions in which banks were able to choose differing strategies, some of them riskier. In international finance, the euro-dollar market emerged, and the ability of financial institutions to use this as a vehicle for avoiding exchange controls helped to lead to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods pegged exchange rate system. In national financial systems fringe banks (and non-bank financial institutions) emerged to exploit business opportunities that the main commercial banks were prevented from entering by direct credit controls. This disintermediation into uncontrolled, and sometimes less reputable, institutions led to inherent weakness, e.g. the British fringe bank crisis (1973/74 ). This in turn generated pressures to dismantle the prior direct controls, freeing banks to decide on the disposition of their portfolios. But for the prior 35/40 years bankers had had relatively little experience or training in risk assessment. And with the macro-economic conjuncture becoming more volatile in the late 1960s and 1970s, it is no surprise that banks, and banking systems, similarly became more unstable.
As already noted, the institutional structure of banking supervision at this juncture was extremely diverse, with CBs sometimes playing no supervisory role and sometimes having full responsibility for bank supervision. But whatever their supervisory role, CBs must have a functional concern and an operational role in the maintenance of systemic stability of the banking and payments' system, and for the resolution of financial crisis, should such stability be threatened. This latter consideration implies that CBs will want, and need, to play a continuing role in designing the regulations (rules) under which the banks operate, even if the supervision of banks, (that is checking that the rules are actually observed and imposing sanctions when they are not), is conducted by a separate institution. The importance and relevance of so distinguishing between regulation and supervision is emphasised in Lastra (1996, Chapter 2, and 2006, Chapter 3) .
The fact that payments are finally settled in transfers of a CB's own liabilities gives it a necessary role in overseeing a country's payments and settlements systems, both internally and externally (e.g. in FX markets, CLS, Target, Swift, etc.). Somewhat more arguably, this may also extend to a concern with the risk management and payment and settlement systems of the other major financial markets (for bonds, equities and, perhaps, commodities) within its purview. A CB has to be concerned with stability in monetary systems, primarily overall price stability, but inevitably including financial market stability more widely. After all, a CB usually seeks to maintain price stability by (money) market operations, (to sustain some chosen level of interest rates), and such market operations will be impeded and less effective if such markets have become disturbed and subject to panics. Neither its (money) market operations nor its macro-economy policy objectives (price stability) will be achieved smoothly if financial institutions and markets are in a state of crisis.
Moreover there is no other institution, besides the CB, that can create liquidity quickly in a crisis, and injections of liquidity are frequently a prerequisite for crisis management. Alternatives have been tried. One such example is a consortium of commercial banks, acting together in their role as managers of a Clearing House, (see Timberlake, 1984) . But historical experience, notably in the USA, showed that their ability to stem a crisis was limited and subject to commercial conflicts of interest.
Another possibility is for the government to act on its own, and some such government action may indeed become necessary when (some of) the banks involved are (probably) insolvent. But such government action has its own disadvantages, of delay, of (potential) corruption and favouritism; and the intermediation in the process of a disinterested and professional CB is comparatively preferable.
9
In a recent paper, his inaugural lecture, Buiter (2006) has suggested that, not only should the responsibility for banking supervision be hived off to a separate supervisory body, but also that that body be given sufficiently large overdraft facilities (with the CB) to undertake liquidity injections attendant on crisis management on its own. Our response to that is that the supervisory body would then become the de facto CB, and the other body setting (nominal) interest rates would just be a macro-economic committee (not a Bank of any kind). It is, perhaps, arguable that the macro-economic function of a CB should be separated from the banking and stability functions of a CB, and transferred to a Committee of 'wise men', of professional economists; this does seem to be the direction of current trends, but we doubt whether it is really possible, or desirable, to try to separate macro-economic stability issues from financial market (and institutional) stability matters. Taking these four developments in reverse order:-First, the growing importance of finance/pensions to a growing swathe of the population enhanced its political salience.
This meant that conduct of business/consumer protection issues would tend to loom even larger in (retail) regulatory/supervisory matters, (see Westrup, Chapter 9 in Masciandaro and Quintyn, 2007) . CBs, with a primarily economic rather than legal/accounting tradition, and a comparatively small staff, were not well placed to do this kind of work, and did not wish to take it on. Second, the blurring of commercial divisions again implied that CBs would have to extend their field of professional competence, (and perhaps the safety net), to a wider range of institutions (markets) than those with which they had been historically involved. Only in a few, mostly small countries such as Ireland and Singapore, was responsibility for supervision of the full range of financial institutions vested in the CB.
Third, inflation targetry involved not only making price stability the primary objective, but also giving the CB operational independence (from government) to vary interest rates so as to achieve that end. For most CBs, who had become increasingly subservient (to governments) under the requirements of WWII and post-war socialism, this was a marked recovery of power. Moreover, the successful pursuit of price stability is much facilitated by the credibility of the CB, so that expectations of future inflation should remain anchored. But financial intermediation is a risky business, and there will always be shady and fraudulent fringes of the financial system; 'a fool and his money are soon parted'. Any regulatory/supervisory system that attempts to prevent all risk and any fraud will stifle enterprise and be impossibly heavy-handed. But the supervisor will take the blame for any crises/frauds as do occur. Frequently supervisory authorities will be simultaneously accused of being both too restrictive and also too lax to prevent failures. Being a supervisor, therefore, entails considerable reputational risk. A CB which is trying to maintain credibility, in order to assist its primary role of hitting an inflation target, might regard being also allocated a supervisory function as a poisoned chalice.
Moreover, the combination of operational independence, to achieve price stability, together with supervisory oversight over the whole financial system, might seem to concentrate excessive power in the hands of unelected CB officials. Would that be entirely consistent with democratic government? There is, perhaps, some tendency for governments to combine the award of operational independence to a CB with the removal of peripheral roles, such as banking supervision, debt management, etc., as occurred in the UK in 1997. This, it may be claimed, enhances CB focus on its main responsibility, and lessons potential conflicts of interest, (and incidentally will please the Ministry of Finance, which normally has an underlying rivalry with the CB).
Putting the same issue around the other way, a CB that loses its macroeconomic monetary policy role, as the National Central Banks (NCBs) did within the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), will struggle much harder to retain its remaining supervisory functions; there are many current examples of this amongst the NCBs. utterly blurred, the separation between the objectives of consumer protection and conduct of business concerns, mostly in retail markets, on the one hand and systemic stability, crisis management, issues on the other remains. Inevitably conduct of business issues will be much more frequent in occurrence, and require many more staff, than for systemic stability. Also the skills of the staff dealing with such issues will diverge, involving lawyers and accountants for conduct of business, and (financial) economists for systemic stability. It is also arguable that conduct of business concerns will occur primarily in retail markets, and will tend to require more detailed rules and regulations, than systemic issues, which may occur more often in wholesale markets, and may be handled more expeditiously by the application of principles-based rules.
Bundling these two main functions together in a single, universal FSA could, perhaps, lead to the systemic function being swamped by the sheer number of those involved in the conduct of business function. Essentially economic issues pertaining to systemic stability could be decided by committees dominated by those with legal and accountancy training, (see Goodhart, Schoenmaker and Dasgupta, 2002 ). Yet the social welfare benefits of preventing, and successfully resolving, financial crises greatly outweigh the gains from better customer protection by all accounts. There is, therefore, a prima facie case at least for a 'twin peaks' approach, whereby the conduct-of-business regulatory/supervisory function is separated from the systemic stability role (see Taylor 1995 , and Taylor and Fleming, 1999 . This is now done in Australia and the Netherlands. Clearly no CB would want to be involved in the conduct of business specialist exercise. In practice, the body given responsibility for systemic stability issues has been located outside the CB both in Australia, where is just that much more difficult to model. In particular, financial (in)stability is generated by the probability of default (PD) and bankruptcy. In contrast, most mainstream macro and monetary analysis makes the assumption that no economic agent ever defaults. This latter assumption enormously simplifies modelling and allows for the use of representative agents, whereas a considered treatment of PD must face heterogeneity, i.e. some agents follow a riskier strategy with a higher PD than others.
Given the inherent implausibility of a world without default, it is quite remarkable how much such current mainstream models can achieve in monetary and macroeconomic analysis and policy prescription; Woodford's, Money and Interest (2003) is an icon in this respect. Whether, or not, such monetary policy analysis would retain all its validity in a more realistic setting, it is just not possible to approach an analysis of financial stability without addressing bankruptcy, PD, and the heterogeneity of agents, both banks and their clients, head on.
11 Also see Kahn and Santos, (2007) , and the literature review therein.
There are two main approaches to a theoretical assessment of the probability of default in the literature. The first was initiated by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , and has been extended most notably by Allen and Gale, (see Understanding Financial
Crises, 2007, and the references therein). In this model the uncertainty is generated by lack of knowledge about when depositors may need to withdraw their money from the bank. This risk is exacerbated by the illiquidity of (some of) the banks' assets.
Although the ultimate return from such illiquid assets is, (in most of these exercises), assumed to be known and certain, there is a friction in these models whereby early redemption of such illiquid assets can only be done at a cost, so much so that the commercial bank may then not be able to honour its pledge to redeem all its deposits (plus stated interest) at par. Because of the sequential repayment convention, (first come, first served), when the probability of failure to repay rises above some small probability, a run ensues, and the bank(s) default.
In this approach, insolvency derives from illiquidity. It is certainly true that at a time when financial institutions are under strain, and need to raise extra cash, there can be severe stress in asset markets, and asset prices can fall sharply, (Cifuentes, et al. (2005) , Shin (2005a and b) . This is an externality whereby pressure to realise assets in one segment of the financial system can impact on every other agent by lowering asset prices and thereby weakening their balance sheet strength. There is, however, one particular advantage that this genre of crisis literature possesses. This is that in such models generally either all depositors run and then default becomes certain, or nobody runs and the bank(s) remain solvent. Thus there is little need to model the probability of default, (PD). This contrasts with the main other branch of the literature, and most practical concerns, where default arises from declines in the value of bank assets, e.g. arising from credit or market risk. The main uncertainty in this latter genre is about the value of bank assets, insolvency rather than illiquidity. Of course these two, insolvency and illiquidity, go hand in hand, since depositors will flee, and potential lenders will refrain, from a bank perceived as potentially in trouble. So the first sign of potential insolvency is often actual illiquidity, a syndrome which causes problems for CBs.
A problem for modelling such causes of systemic crisis is that incorporating PD (and loss given default, LGD) into a theoretical model is hard to do since default is by definition a discontinuity. In our own view, as expressed in Goodhart et al. (2006) "A model of financial fragility", the best way to do so that has yet been devised was developed by Dubey et al. (2005) and Shubik and Wilson (1997) . Shubik sees every agent as choosing a strategy, depending on his/her risk aversion, which will generate differing PDs, and losses given default (LGDs), depending on the state of the world.
There have to be penalties for bankruptcy, which penalties may be non-pecuniary; otherwise no one would ever repay and no one would lend. The penalties cannot be extreme, or no one would borrow.
Indeed, the probability of default (PD) is a key concept in any analysis of financial fragility. It is, of course, central to the Basel II exercise. At the more formal level, modelling of default, following on from the approach pioneered by Martin Shubik and his co-authors, is the crucial element for the analysis of financial fragility that we have been developing. (See Tsomocos, 2003a , Tsomocos, 2003b Goodhart et al., 2004 Goodhart et al., , 2005 Goodhart et al., , 2006a Aspachs et al., 2007; Tsomocos and Zicchino, 2005) .
Our model incorporates heterogeneous banks and capital requirements in a general equilibrium model 12 with incomplete markets, money and default. It extends over two periods and all uncertainty is resolved in the second period. Trade takes place in both periods in the goods market. In the first period agents also borrow from, or deposit money with banks, mainly to achieve a preferred time path for consumption. Banks In the first period trades by all agents take place against a background of uncertainty 12 For an extensive description of this variant of the model see Appendix A and Goodhart et al. (2005) .
about the economic conditions (the state of nature) that will prevail in the second period. Agents are, however, assumed to have rational expectations, and to know the likelihood of good or bad states occurring when they make their choices in period one. In period two the actual economic conjuncture is revealed and all uncertainty is resolved.
The model incorporates a number of distinct, i.e. heterogeneous, commercial banks, each characterised by a unique risk/return preference and different initial capital.
Since each bank is, and is perceived as being, different, it follows that there is not a single market for either bank loans or bank deposits. In addition, we introduce limited access to consumer credit markets, with each household assigned (by history and custom) to borrow from a predetermined bank. This feature allows for different interest rates across the commercial banking sector. In sum, multiple credit and deposit markets lead to different loan rates among various banks and to endogenous credit spreads between loan and deposit rates.
Individual non-bank agents are also assumed to differ in their risk attitudes and hence in their preferences for default. We model the incentive for avoiding default by penalising agents and banks proportionately to the size of default. Banks that violate their capital adequacy constraint are also penalised in proportion to the shortfall of capital. Both banks and households are allowed to default on their financial obligations, but not on commodity deliveries.
Our specification of the banking sector involves three banks, and can, in principle, be applied to the banking system of any country, or region. Banks γ and δ can represent any two of these individual banks, or groups of banks, whereas bank τ represents the aggregation of the remaining banks. We have done calibration exercises in which banks γ and δ were be chosen specifically to represent two actual UK banks (Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos, 2005) .
All banks in the model, b ε B = {γ,δ,τ}, are assumed to operate under a perfectly competitive environment (i.e. they take all interest rates as exogenously given when making their optimal portfolio decisions). The structure of their balance sheets is given below;
Assets Liabilities Loans to agents
Deposits from Mr. Φ Interbank deposits
Interbank borrowing Market book Equity Others
We assume that all banks endogenise their decisions in the loan, deposit and interbank markets. 13 The remaining variables are treated as exogenous. 14 We further assume that banks can default on their financial obligations, subject to default penalties set by the regulator. Thus, by varying the penalties imposed on default from 0 to infinity, we can model 100% default, no default or an equilibrium level of default between 0 and 13 The modelling of the banking sector follows Shubik and Tsomocos (1992) and Tsomocos (2003a and b) .
14 As explained in Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2005) , we cannot endogenise banks' decisions on market book or equity. Since the model has two states in the second period and one unconstrained asset, (i.e. the interbank market investment), adding another unconstrained asset would make the markets complete.
100%
. 15 At first sight, this `continuous' default rate approach may seem problematic since in reality banks either repay in full at the due date or are forced to close down.
However, we interpret a bank's default rate in our model as a probability that such bank chooses to shut down, and hence in the short run to default completely on its financial obligations. Therefore, a bank's decision to increase its default rates is isomorphic to its decision to adopt a riskier position in pursuit of higher expected profitability. 16 With a large number of agents, as in a competitive equilibrium, conditions where everyone defaults on, say, 5% of their liabilities are equivalent to those where 5% of agents default on all their debts. This, however, is not the case when there are only a few agents in a concentrated field. If there are, say, only two agents in the field, and their failures are independent of each other, then in 0.25% of all cases there will be 100% default, in 9.75% of cases 50% default, and in 90% of cases no default, which is clearly vastly different from a 5% default rate amongst a large number of agents.
In most countries banking is a concentrated service industry. Moreover, reputational effects and cross-default clauses, amongst other things, mean that banks cannot default partially and remain open. If they cannot meet their payment obligations, (except under force majeure as in 9/11), they have to close their doors. Except when such closed banks are tiny, such closure does not however, in almost all cases, then turn into permanent liquidation. Effectively almost all banks are restructured, in some 15 This modelling of default follows Shubik and Wilson (1977) . 16 For more on this issue, see Tsomocos and Zicchino (2005) .
countries via a `bridge bank' arrangement 17 , in others by what is effectively nationalisation, and shortly re-open, with the extent of short-fall of assets distributed amongst the various creditors, (the `haircut' in the American phrase), the shareholders and taxpayers depending on the deposit insurance arrangements, bank bankruptcy laws and political pressures. In this latter sense, even though the banking system is concentrated, and banks have to close when they cannot meet due payments, it is perfectly valid to assess strategies as bringing about possible conditions in which a bank defaults by, say, 5% to all depositors, because that would be the effective loss of funds, or haircut, in the event of a bad state of the world.
Finally, as in Bhattacharya et al. (2003), we make the simplifying assumption that banks' default rates in the deposit and interbank markets are the same, i.e. that banks are restricted to repay all their creditors in the same proportion.
Banks can also violate their capital adequacy requirement, subject to capital requirement violation penalties set by the regulator. In principle, each bank's effective capital to asset ratios may not be binding, (i.e. their values may be above the regulator's requirement), in which case they are not subject to any capital requirement penalty. However, in our calibration exercises, we assume that each bank wants to keep a buffer above the required minimum, so that there is a non-pecuniary loss of reputation as capital declines; in this sense the ratios are always binding. Put differently, we assume that banks' self-imposed ideal capital holdings are always above the actual values of all banks' capital to asset ratios. Given this assumption, we can rule out corner equilibria and therefore focus our analysis entirely on well-defined interior solutions whereby banks violate their enhanced capital requirements. We assume that penalties are linear as capital declines from its ideal level.
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We have used this model for simulation (Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos, 2004) , calibration (Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos, 2005) , and to develop a quantified metric of financial stability, (Aspachs, Goodhart, et al. 2006 and . We certainly would not claim that financial stability, and PD, must be modelled in this manner; indeed like any model it has numerous deficiencies, on some of which we are continuing to work, in particular on the attempt to model liquidity within this framework. But we do believe that any serious model of financial fragility has to include and be centred around measures of PD, and that our own approach makes a start in that direction, a start which we hope others will soon overtake.
One reason for developing models of this kind is that they could be used to overcome one of the main weaknesses of the current methodologies for assessing systemic stability. Such methodologies are often based on stress, or scenario, tests. In such tests, a scenario is assumed wherein some bad state occurs, and the banks are then asked what that might do to their profitability and capital adequacy. But this usually measures only a first round effect. If such bad outcomes did happen, the banks would often respond to these first round effects by reducing their loan extension and becoming themselves more conservative. This would have second round effects on asset prices, risk premia, and real economic activity, usually then amplifying the original first-round effect. While it is possible, in principle, to iterate through various rounds of effect in collaboration with the (main) commercial banks, in practice this is virtually never done. Instead, using a (centralised) model, such as ours, does enable one to estimate the equilibrium outcome; that is one of its main purposes. Of course our model depends on several variables that are difficult to observe, such as the degree of risk aversion and the risk strategies being adopted by both banks and their borrowers. But these are key fundamental elements in the determination of systemic stability. As all sensible CB officials know, it is just when (over) confidence during periods of boom and expansion leads banks and their borrowers to accept (or ignore) more risk in pursuit of higher returns that the seeds of the next crisis are sown. It happens all the time.
C. Conclusions
It is rare to recognize that one is living in a golden age. It is usually only by contrast to a miserable present that the past seems, often mistakenly, golden. Yet much of the world, including Europe, North America, and most of Asia, has been living in such a golden age in the last 15 years with low, and stable, inflation and steady growth.
Much of this, though how much remains debatable, is due to improved macromonetary policies, themselves a function of the new consensus of how such policies should be conducted. As the other papers in this symposium demonstrate, the consensus is not total, and there remains much to debate. But the range of agreement on the macro-monetary side is far greater than the remaining areas of disagreement.
The same cannot be said about the second core purpose of CBs, of maintaining systemic stability. The practical record remains patchy. There have been many more banking crises, than in the quiet years of 1935-65. Many cases of potential bank failures, e.g. in China and Japan, have been pushed under the rug by throwing taxpayers' money at the problem. Difficulties in achieving good outcomes have been partly responsible for experimentation in the organisation and structure of the regulatory/supervisory system. As recorded in Section A such experimentation has not, at any rate so far, resulted in any consensus on the best approach for this purpose.
The procedures for doing so are further complicated by the fact that banking and finance are becoming increasingly international in structure, whereas regulation/supervision has to be based on a specific legal structure, which is inherently national in coverage (as emphasized in Lastra, 2006) ; likewise crisis management depends primarily on national fiscal purses.
The agreement on the appropriate macro-monetary policies is based on an underlying consensus on the basic theoretical framework. There is no such consensus and no such framework, (and little enough basic theory), that relates to systemic stability. This is partly because such theoretical analysis is more difficult and complex, than that underlying macro-monetary policies. We have argued here that any serious theory of systemic (in)stability has to focus on PD, yet PD is assumed away entirely (by the transversality condition) in the macro consensus model. 19 We end by presenting a (somewhat potted) version of our own attempt to take default seriously.
It is at best a start, mais c'est le premier pas qui coute. subject to 
Deposit Supply
Unlike the loan markets, we do not assume limited participation in the deposit markets. This implies that  can choose to diversify his deposits with every bank. There are seven active markets in the model (three consumer loan, three deposit and one interbank markets). Each of these markets determines an interest rate that equilibrates demand and supply in equilibrium. 
We note that these interest rates, i.e. r b , r d b , and , b ∈ B , are the ex ante nominal interest rates that incorporate default premium since default is permitted in equilibrium. Their effective (ex post) interest rates have to be suitably adjusted to account for default in their corresponding markets.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium in this economy is characterised by a vector of all choice variables of 21 See Goodhart et al. (2003) for an extensive discussion. 22 The interest rate formation mechanism is identical to the offer-for-sale mechanism in Dubey and Shubik (1978) . The denominator of each of the expressions (15-17) represents the supply side whereas the numerator divided by 1  r, r ∈ r b , r d b , , b ∈ B corresponds to the demand. Note that this interest rate formation mechanism is well-defined both in, and out of, equilibrium. 23 For more on the method of calculating the ex post interest rates, see Shubik and Tsomocos (1992) .
active agents such that banks maximise their payoff function subject to their budget constraints, all markets clear (i.e. conditions 16, 17, and 18 are satisfied), bank  is correct in its expectation about the repayment rates that it gets from its interbank investment, and, finally, loan demand, deposit supply, repayments rates, and GDP in both states s satisfy the reduced form equations (12)- (15).
